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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the premier 
center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law Center, in the 
heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative solutions for the leading 
health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic diseases to health care 
financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law Center and School of Nursing 
and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable intellectual resources, including the 
School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has been, and 
will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, national, and 
local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper understanding of the multiple 
ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill Institute hopes to advance scholarship, 
research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-makers in the public, private, and civil society 
sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for enabling more people in the United States and 
throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
• Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon their 
graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, physicians, 
nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many other private, 
public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare graduates to engage 
in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care law and policy and to 
rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, economic, scientific, and 
ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
• Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, using 
a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond a narrow 
vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a scientific endeavor.   
 
• Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between key 
policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent and 
knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order to 
address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President Obama 
and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health reform.  In any 
debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, economic, and legal issues 
is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these issues could lead to a series of high-
stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that advocates of reform strategies anticipate such 
issues in order to decrease the likelihood that legally resolvable questions become barriers to 
substantive health reform.   In an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance 
of the heat of political debate, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown 
University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health 
Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may arise in 
any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research organizations are 
exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health reform, the O’Neill 
Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health reform.  The target audience 
includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key executive and legislative branch 
agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other key players.  This project attempts to 
pave the road towards improved health care for the nation by providing stakeholders a concise analysis 
of the complex legal issues relating to health reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions 
available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are reoccurring questions which are policy-
based and those which are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the distinction 
between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of health 
reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for poverty level 
subsidies and cost-sharing for preventative services.  In contrast, legal issues are those involving 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution allows a certain 
congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as those 
beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning with, “Can 
we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular categories: 1) “Under the 
Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and regulations, can we now…?”; 3)  “ 
Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This final set of questions tends to be mixed 
questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of 
political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems addressed 
are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a constructive 
activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.   Consequently, it 
does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is it an attempt to 
provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  Furthermore, this project 
does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or make recommendations among 
them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide policy makers, attorneys, and other key 
stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health reform and a clear 
articulation of the range of solutions available for resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, and 
current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of over 50 legal 
issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified these ten legal 
issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a bipartisan consultation 
session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and framing of the legal issues.  The 
attendees of the consultation session included congressional staff, executive branch officials, 
advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide range of interests affected by health 
reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal 
issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant reform 
proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are multiple other 
legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is adopted, the system 
changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for an immediate discussion of 
federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The increased use of health information technology (health IT) is a common element of nearly every 
health reform proposal because it has the potential to decrease costs, improve health outcomes, 
coordinate care, and improve public health.  However, it raises concerns about security and privacy of 
medical information.  This paper examines some of the “gaps” in privacy protections that arise out of 
the current federal health privacy standard, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, the main federal law which governs the use and disclosure of health 
information.  Additionally, it puts forth a range of possible solutions, accompanied by arguments for 
and against each.  The solutions provide some options for strengthening the current legal framework of 
privacy protections in order to build public trust in health IT and facilitate its use for health reform.  
The current economic stimulus legislation has a number of provisions amending HIPAA and its 
regulations.  Thus, depending on the outcome of this legislation, portions of this paper may need to be 
updated. 
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
The perceived “gaps” in current federal legal protections for health information can be grouped into 
four categories: 1) who is covered; 2) what is covered; 3) state law variation; and 4) insufficient 
comprehension of and compliance with privacy protections.  The solutions range from amending 
existing law or regulation to encouraging private action through market or other incentives. 
• Who is covered: Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require the 
federal agencies to issue new privacy regulations to cover activities of new entities; revise 
regulations and expand recent guidance on business associate agreements to include all health 
information exchanges in existence or development; require all entities handling health 
information to adopt policies consistent with fair information practices; and/or keep the law in 
its current state and encourage adoption of good privacy practices through voluntary business 
agreements. 
 
• What is covered: Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal heath information to 
determine the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance; establish a federal 
breach notification law applicable to identifiable health information; seek the input of experts 
and public to  examine the de-identification safe harbor exception; create more options for the 
use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers and require data use agreements for all 
data disclosures; require those obtaining data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to 
keeping data deidentified except in certain circumstances; strengthen, establish, and increase 
compliance with HIPAA rules regarding the use of personal information for marketing; adopt 
rules governing marketing uses by non-covered entities such as Internet health sites; issue more 
guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule; issue new regulations regarding terms of 
access to health information exchanges. 
 
• State law variation: “Wipe the slate clean” and have Congress could establish a new federal 
privacy law that preempts existing state laws but allows states to pass new stronger privacy 
provisions; and/or keep the status quo with the federal standard as a floor.    
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• Improving comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and enforcement: 
Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex; provide more guidance and better education 
on the requirements of the rules; improve consumer education on HIPAA rights by requiring 
entities to provide a summary notice; ensure a proper enforcement regime for entities not 
covered by HIPAA that handle personal health information; amend HIPAA enforcement to 
clarify enforcement authority and also direct the Secretary to pursue civil actions; amend 
HIPAA to allow the Secretary to directly enforce HIPAA regulations against business 
associates; and/or amend HIPAA to allow a private right of action. 
 
CURRENT LAW AND EXISTING “GAPS”: 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA):  The use of health information 
is currently covered by HIPAA and its implementing regulations.  The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) issued final regulations in 2002, which became effective for most entities 
covered by HIPAA in 2003.  The HIPAA privacy regulations set forth rules governing the access, use, 
and disclosure of personal health information by most traditional health care entities.  The goal of the 
regulations is to ensure that health information is rapidly accessible to those authorized, but kept 
confidential and protected from inappropriate use.   
• Who is covered: The Privacy Rule only applies to entities expressly defined in the HIPAA 
statute, which places unmentioned, new, and emerging entities outside the direct coverage of 
the rule. 
• What is covered: The Privacy Rule regulates the type of health information that can be shared 
by covered entities and for what purposes.  But individuals are concerned that their personal 
health information will not be protected in the emerging e-health environment.  For example, 
privacy may be at risk due to the lack of federal notification standards for breaches; the 
possibility that developments in technology may make “de-identified” data (not covered under 
the Privacy Rule) re-identifiable; and the lack of strong prohibition on the use of personal 
health information for marketing purposes.  
• State law variation: The Privacy Rule is only a minimum standard, which gives states the 
power to enact more stringent protections for health privacy. The resulting variations in state 
privacy laws may pose an obstacle to health information exchange across state lines and/or to a 
national health information system. 
• Insufficient comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and enforcement: 
Entities covered by the Privacy Rule and individuals/patients do not adequately comprehend 
the Privacy Rule’s provisions, leading health care entities to either over- or under-interpret the 
Rule and leaving individuals unaware of their privacy rights.  In addition, there has been debate 
among policymakers and stakeholders over 1) whether the Rule to date has been appropriately 
enforced; 2) whether or not the current mechanisms are adequate to ensure compliance; and 3) 
what the limits of the enforcement mechanisms should be. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Generally, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of health 
information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and security.  
However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures need to be put in 
place continues to be a challenge.  The new Administration and Congress are moving forward to 
increase the use of health IT.  Any efforts to reform the nation’s health systems and to increase the 
adoption of health IT will need to address the concerns surrounding the privacy and security of 
personal health information.  
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
Privacy and Health Information Technology 
Deven McGraw* 
 
Introduction    
 
In discussions of health reform, the increased use of health information technology (health IT) is a 
common element of nearly every serious proposal on the table.  Health IT includes electronic health 
records kept by providers, personal health records offered by health insurance plans or owned by 
consumers, and electronic health information exchanges.  Although health reform initiatives being 
discussed contain little detail regarding health IT, in general they promote health IT to facilitate the 
electronic sharing of health information to improve individual and population health.  During the 2008 
Presidential Campaign, the health care proposals of both President Obama and Senator McCain 
discussed health IT.  President Obama’s proposal invests $50 billion over the next five years to 
promote the adoption of health IT with privacy safeguards.1  Senator McCain’s plan also encouraged 
the adoption of health IT, with an emphasis on coordination.2   
 
Proponents hope that the increased use of health IT will improve health outcomes for individual 
patients by facilitating the delivery of evidence-based care and reducing medical errors.  Additionally, 
proponents hope that increasing information sharing among providers will better coordinate care 
within and across health care settings.  Health IT facilitates the creation of a comprehensive health 
record that can move with an individual over his or her lifetime, in contrast to the fragmented records 
that exist today.  Further, health IT is promoted as a critical tool for improving population health by 
allowing for the more efficient gathering of data regarding the effectiveness of certain treatments.  
Finally, health IT is also expected to help decrease health care costs by reducing the duplication of 
services and the delivery of unnecessary or inappropriate care.  
 
This paper briefly summarizes current federal health privacy law and examines some “gaps” in privacy 
protections that have been identified by some policymakers and stakeholders in recent debates on this 
topic.  Additionally, the paper puts forth a range of possible solutions, accompanied by some 
arguments for and against each idea. The proposals in the paper do not represent the universe of 
possible solutions to each issue; many of them also are not mutually exclusive.  The arguments 
provided in support for or against a particular idea also do not represent all of the arguments for or 
against any policy option.  The solutions do, however, provide some options for beginning the 
conversation about how we can best strengthen our legal framework of privacy protections to build 
public trust in health IT and facilitate its use to reform the health care system.  The current economic 
stimulus legislation has a number of provisions amending the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its regulations, the main federal law which governs the use and 
disclosure of health information.   Thus, depending on the outcome of this legislation, portions of this 
paper may need to be updated. 
  
There is widespread agreement that protecting individuals’ health information is necessary in order to 
build public trust in e-health systems and to help drive the widespread adoption of health IT.   But 
unlike other topics addressed in the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, current health privacy 
laws arguably do not pose a legal obstacle to health IT.  For example, there are no federal health 
privacy laws that prohibit or directly inhibit the sharing of information electronically for health 
purposes and that require specific action to resolve.  Instead, the debate centers more around whether 
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current health privacy laws are sufficient to build a foundation of trust in health IT that will support an 
information sharing environment that will improve health care and our health care system – and if not, 
what more needs to be done.  This makes the path to resolution more difficult, as stakeholders may 
hold very different opinions about the extent of the problem and the appropriate solutions.    
 
Survey data show that a large majority of the public wants electronic access to their health information 
– both for themselves and for their health care providers – because they believe such access is likely to 
increase the quality of their health care.  At the same time, people have significant concerns about the 
privacy of their health information on-line.  In a 2006 survey, when Americans were asked about the 
benefits of and concerns about online health information: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
80% were very concerned about identity theft or fraud; 
77% were very concerned about their medical information being used for marketing purposes; 
56% were concerned about employers having access to their health information; and 
53% were concerned about insurers gaining access to this information.3  
 
Health IT is better equipped than are paper records to protect sensitive personal health information.  
For example, it is often impossible to tell whether someone has inappropriately accessed a paper 
record.  By contrast, technology - including strong user authentication and tracking mechanisms - can 
be employed to automatically limit and monitor access to electronic health information.  Additionally, 
electronic health information exchange networks can be designed to facilitate data sharing among 
health care entities for appropriate purposes without needing to create new, centralized databases of 
sensitive information that will be attractive targets for marketers and those seeking health data for 
commercial gain, or that can be vulnerable to security breaches.  If a system is breached, sensitive data 
can be protected, in part, by encryption and other security methods.  Technology can never be made 
100% tamperproof – but it can be more protective than paper records at preventing inappropriate 
access to information and helping ensure that when there is abuse, the perpetrators will be detected and 
punished. 
 
At the same time, absent strong privacy and security safeguards, the computerization of personal health 
information can magnify the risk to privacy.  Tens of thousands of health records can be accessed 
through a single breach.4  Recent headlines about breaches of electronic records underscore these 
concerns.  The cumulative effect of reports of data breaches and inappropriate access to medical 
records deepens consumer distrust in the ability of electronic health information systems to provide 
adequate privacy and security protections.   
 
Failing to address public concerns about the privacy of their health information could have significant 
consequences. Without appropriate protections for privacy and security in the healthcare system, some 
patients engage in “privacy-protective” behaviors to avoid having their personal health information 
used inappropriately.5  According to a recent poll, one in six adults (17%) – representing about 38 
million persons – say they withhold information from their health providers due to worries about how 
the medical data might be disclosed.6   Persons who report that they are in fair or poor health and racial 
and ethnic minorities (who report even higher levels of concern about the privacy of their personal 
medical records) are more likely than average to practice privacy-protective behaviors.7  Due to the 
reality of privacy risks associated with the computerization of health information, the movement to e-
health could increase the percentage of people who engage in privacy protective behaviors.  Ignoring 
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these concerns – or inadequately addressing them – will significantly threaten public trust in these new 
systems.  
 
In general, stakeholders largely agree that entities that handle electronic personal health information 
should be subject to a baseline set of privacy standards.  This consensus breaks down, however, when 
the discussion gets to the details.  For example: 
 
• Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new legal standards for 
entities not currently covered? 
• What protections need to be in place?  For example, do we rely on current HIPAA rules or are 
modifications needed, either to address new challenges or because the rules, in the view of 
some, were imperfect from the start? 
• Are these concerns best addressed through changes in statute or regulations, or is it best to 
police this nascent marketplace through business best practices (or a combination of both)?  
• Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal standards that preempt the 
field? 
• What should we do to ensure compliance with and appropriate enforcement of privacy 
protections? 
 
Efforts to achieve some progress on these issues began in the 110th Congress; but none was resolved 
before it adjourned.   
.  
A brief list of all proposed solutions in each category (without explanatory text and without the sample 
arguments for and against) can be found at Appendix A at the end of this paper. 
 
I.   Current Federal Law 
 
With respect to protecting health information privacy, public policymakers are not faced with a blank 
slate.  Within the traditional healthcare system, uses of health information are covered by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its implementing regulations.  
When Congress enacted HIPAA to facilitate, among other things, the electronic transmission of health 
care claims to reduce administrative costs, lawmakers recognized the need to protect the privacy and 
security of health information when data moves electronically.  Congress gave itself two years to enact 
federal privacy legislation – but ended up tasking the Department of Health and Human Services to 
promulgate privacy and security regulations to cover information transactions under the purview of 
HIPAA.  The regulations were finalized in 2002 and effective for most entities covered by HIPAA by 
2003.  The HIPAA statute sets forth the definition of entities covered by the law and important 
provisions with respect to HIPAA enforcement; the bulk of the HIPAA privacy and security 
requirements are in the regulations. 
 
The HIPAA privacy regulations – known collectively as the “Privacy Rule” – are based on fair 
information practices and set forth rules governing the access, use, and disclosure of personal health 
information (or “protected health information”) 8 by most traditional health care system entities (for 
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example, providers, hospitals, laboratories, pharmacies, and health plans). In summary, the Privacy 
Rule permits covered entities9 to access, use, and disclose “protected health information”10 for 
purposes of treatment,11 payment,12 and health care operations.13 The Rule also allows access, use, and 
disclosure for 1) certain lawful public health purposes, as required by law, 2) reporting abuse or 
domestic violence, 3) health oversight activities, 4) judicial and administrative proceedings, and 5) law 
enforcement purposes.  Covered entities may disclose information to family members, and in facility 
or office directories, as long as the patient doesn’t object.  All other purposes not specifically 
mentioned in the rule require prior patient authorization to access, use, or disclose information.  The 
Privacy Rule applies to identifiable health information regardless of whether it is in paper or electronic 
form.    
 
HIPAA provides a federal floor, or minimum standard, of privacy protection.  It expressly preserves 
State laws that provide stronger privacy protections for health information.14  Such State privacy laws 
include more stringent requirements regarding access, use and disclosure of particularly sensitive 
categories of health information, such as mental health records and HIV testing and treatment records.  
The variation in state laws poses difficulties to a uniform privacy standard.   
 
Other federal laws apply privacy protections to specific types of information, or have limited 
application in specific contexts.  For example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
prohibits employers from using genetic information to make employment decisions and prohibits 
health insurers from using such information to make coverage and underwriting determinations.15  The 
Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act, the regulations governing substance abuse treatment 
facilities receiving federal funds (commonly known as Part 2), and the Privacy Act of 1974 cover only 
certain settings of care.16   
 
With respect to health information on-line or in consumer-owned personal health records, the Federal 
Trade Commission can use its “unfair and deceptive trade practices” authority to hold some entities 
accountable for failure to comply with their privacy policies. Federal law does not require these entities 
to have a privacy policy, or require that certain elements be included in such a policy if it exists.  Some 
have said that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) protects personal health records 
(PHRs) because it prohibits the vendors of those services from disclosing the contents of those records 
without the authorization of the record holder.  However, the relevant ECPA provision applies only to 
services that are offered to the public.17  PHRs available exclusively to employees of a particular 
company, for example, likely fall outside of this part of ECPA. Moreover, ECPA applies only if the 
provider is not authorized to access the contents of a customer’s records for purposes of providing any 
services other than storage or computer processing.18 This caveat may knock out a lot of PHRs that 
provide services beyond data storage, or that are advertising-based and analyze individual patient 
records to target ads.  
 
To keep this paper to a manageable length, it focuses on federal privacy protections that are (or could 
be) more broadly applicable.  
 
II.  Possible Issues to be Resolved  
 
The perceived “gaps” in current federal legal protections for health information can be grouped into the 
following categories:  
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Who is Covered:  The HIPAA Privacy Rule covers only certain “covered entities” as 
defined in the HIPAA statute: specifically, providers, plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.  
Many of the new entities storing, handling or managing personal health information 
electronically do not qualify as covered entities, and thus are not directly covered by the 
Privacy Rule.  As noted above, other federal health privacy laws apply only in specific 
contexts or are otherwise limited in their application.  As a result, there is no baseline set of 
federal health privacy protections that apply to all entities that handle personal health 
information. 
• 
What is Covered:  The Privacy Rule is based on a model of one-to-one electronic 
transmission of health information among traditional health care system entities and their 
business partners who perform health-related functions on their behalf.  Since the HIPAA 
requirements were enacted and promulgated, new opportunities to access and disclose 
health information have arisen (e.g., electronic health information exchanges) which can 
enhance access to greater volumes of identifiable health information more effectively and 
efficiently.  The Rule also did not envision the rise of personal health records designed for 
use by consumers.   Some believe that truly building public trust in e-health systems 
requires strengthening a number of the Privacy Rule’s current provisions and/or the 
promulgation of new or additional legal protections.  Others believe the Privacy Rule 
provides sufficient protections for health information in the new e-health environment, and 
that policymakers merely need to extend its coverage to apply to entities that did not exist 
when the Privacy Rule was implemented.   Similarly, some have suggested approaching 
this question by focusing only on what is new in the e-health environment – new actors or 
new ways to access, use, or disclose information not contemplated when the HIPAA 
regulations were implemented – in order to avoid getting mired in old debates about the 
current HIPAA regulations. 
• 
State Law Variation: As noted above, HIPAA provides a floor of health privacy 
protection.  State laws that provide more stringent protections for health privacy are 
expressly preserved and not preempted.  Some are concerned that the multiplicity of state 
privacy laws will create an obstacle to cross-state or nationwide electronic exchange of 
health information.  The obstacles may arise because of the operation of a state law that 
prohibits information sharing except under certain circumstances (such as with patient 
consent or authorization), or because health care entities are afraid to disclose information 
in a way that might violate an applicable state law.  Others suggest that any information 
sharing obstacles are primarily due to a lack of understanding and varying interpretations of 
state laws, which does not necessarily justify eliminating stronger state privacy protections 
and enacting a single federal standard. 
• 
Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections:  Even five 
years after the Privacy Rule went into effect, there is still a great deal of confusion on the 
part of some entities covered by the Rule about its provisions.  For example, the 34 state 
teams participating in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)-funded 
Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health Information Exchange consistently 
found a “general lack of understanding about some of the basic tenets” of the Privacy Rule 
as well as of state laws concerning health information disclosure.19  The frequent result is a 
more conservative interpretation of the law – a reluctance to disclose information even in 
circumstances where it is expressly permitted – which could create unnecessary and 
• 
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sometimes inappropriate barriers to electronic health information exchange.20  Patients and 
their families also rarely understand the provisions of the HIPAA privacy notice, which is 
the vehicle in the Privacy Rule for informing patients about the potential uses of their health 
information and their rights under the Rule.21  
A. Who Is Covered  
 
As noted above, HIPAA by statute covers only providers (including health care professionals, 
hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories), health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.22 Thus the HIPAA 
privacy and security regulations also apply only to these covered entities.  Under the Privacy Rule, a 
covered entity can contract with a “business associate:” an organization that receives personal health 
information to perform activities or services on behalf of the covered entity, but is not part of their 
workforce.  The HIPAA rules do not apply directly to business associates; instead, business associates 
must be obligated by contract with the covered entity to comply with the HIPAA regulations.  A 
business associate must enter into a “business associate agreement” with the covered entity in order to 
access protected health information.23 This agreement must: 1) spell out the required uses and 
disclosures of such information by the business associate, 2) include a provision prohibiting the 
business associate from further using or disclosing the data other than as permitted in the contract or 
required by law, and 3) contain “satisfactory assurances” that the business associate will “appropriately 
safeguard the information.”24  The HIPAA rules cannot be enforced by the federal government against 
business associates, as discussed in more detail below.   
 
HIPAA currently does not cover a number of entities that have emerged as part of the movement to 
electronic health records.  For example: 
 
• State and regional electronic health information exchanges – often called Regional Health 
Information Organizations (or RHIOs) or Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) – and 
ePrescribing Gateways, all of which may collect or facilitate the exchange of personal health 
information, usually among health care system entities, are not HIPAA covered entities.25 In 
December 2008 HHS issued guidance clarifying that health information networks that merely 
exchange data on behalf of covered entities must be business associates and thus must execute 
business associate agreements.26  However, such guidance does not cover all of the health 
information exchanges currently in existence or in development.  For example, exchanges that 
collect and directly access information in a centralized database are not covered by this 
guidance, and as a result their status under HIPAA is unclear.  
• Personal health records (PHRs) and other consumer-facing health IT tools now being created 
by Internet companies like Microsoft, Google, and WebMD, as well as by employers (for 
example, Dossia, the consortium of eight of America’s largest employers), are not covered by 
HIPAA.27  Because these tools are being designed for primary use by the consumer, individual 
authorization is typically required in order to move information into or out of a PHR.  As a 
result, the vendors of these products have concluded that a business associate agreement is not 
required; OCR has issued no guidance on this practice.   
• Personal health information is migrating onto the Internet through an array of health 
information sites, online support groups, and other on-line health tools.  Often this information 
is voluntarily posted or shared by individuals.  These potential repositories of sensitive health 
information are not covered by HIPAA as either covered entities or business associates – and 
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privacy protections are guaranteed primarily through enforcement by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) of the general prohibition against unfair and deceptive trade practices, such 
as a failure to follow promises made in a privacy policy. 
 
The gaps in HIPAA coverage of these new entities is of concern to some policymakers and industry 
stakeholders and may be an obstacle to promoting the use of these new technologies.  For example, the 
public may not trust that their information will be protected when it is exchanged or stored 
electronically because these non-covered entities are not required to comply with any minimum health 
information privacy standards.   Covered entities may be concerned about an unlevel playing field, 
where their products and services are required to be compliant with current law and the products and 
services of their competitors are not. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require the Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) to promulgate new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these new 
entities. 
Arguments For 
o Arguably provides the most certainty to the market and a more level playing field (even if 
the regulations applied to these new entities are tailored to the particular challenges raised 
by each, as is the case today among the major categories of covered entities). 
 
Arguments Against 
o This could be difficult to achieve, as some entities may resist coverage under HIPAA; 
others may welcome a more certain legal environment. 
o With respect to PHRs, some have argued that HIPAA may not be the appropriate vehicle 
for regulating those provided by non-health care entities.  For example, The National 
Committee for Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) called for protections at least equal to 
HIPAA to be extended to all PHRs – but did not recommend extending HIPAA to do so.28  
The Center for Democracy & Technology has argued that HIPAA will not address the 
particular concerns raised by the handling of personal health information by Internet-based 
companies and other non-health care entities.29 Two of the prominent House bills from the 
110th Congress – the “Protecting Records, Optimizing Treatment, and Easing 
Communication Through Health Care Technology Act of 2008” (the PRO (TECH) T Act) 
(H.R. 6357) and the “Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008” (H.R. 6898) (referred 
to collectively in this paper as the “House bills”) - instead called on HHS and FTC to work 
together to come up with recommendations (or regulations) for privacy protections for 
information in PHRs.30  
o This concern could be ameliorated by ensuring that all health care entities (including 
exchanges) that handle personal health information are required to comply with HIPAA 
(either as covered entities or business associates, depending on their structure and function), 
and imposing new standards on non-health care entities that provide protections similar to 
HIPAA but that are targeted to address the particular concerns raised in this environment. 
 
9 Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new regulations or guidance to clarify that entities such as 
health information exchanges or PHRs that receive protected health information from a covered 
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entity must enter into a business associate agreement and at least be contractually bound to 
safeguard the information and comply with HIPAA. 
Arguments For 
o Does not require legislative action, thus potentially could be accomplished promptly in 
2009. 
Arguments Against 
o Would likely apply only to those entities that are receiving protected health information 
from a covered entity and thus would not protect personal health information entered into 
PHRs or onto Internet health sites directly by individuals.  Also, the business associate 
model currently applies to entities performing tasks on behalf of a covered entity (emphasis 
added).  Thus this model may make sense for health information exchanges (or at least 
those that are operating for the benefit of their covered entity participants); but it makes less 
sense for PHRs, which operate for the benefit of the consumer. 
o Business associates are contractually obligated to adopt health information safeguards or to 
comply with HIPAA.  However, as discussed in more detail below, federal authorities 
cannot hold them accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA. 
9 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies that are 
consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on to establish 
appropriate policies for handling personal information. 31 
 
Arguments For 
o Model is endorsed by NCVHS and the Markle Foundation’s Connecting for Health multi-
stakeholder initiative. 
o Ensures that anyone who handles personal health information is subject to at least a uniform 
baseline set of standards.   
o Eliminates need to continue to revisit this issue as the market evolves and new 
entities/models for sharing health information are introduced. 
o Partial coverage can be achieved by imposing the requirement as a federal funding 
condition. 
o Model is more consistent with data privacy standards adopted by the European 
Commission, thus helping resolve a potential barrier to global data exchange. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Could result in HIPAA requirements for some entities and other, less onerous requirements 
for other entities.   
o Fair information practices (FIPs) provide a good model for moving forward – but FIPs are 
articulated so broadly that building trust in electronic health information sharing may 
require more clearly defined rules (and achieving broad support for such rules may be 
difficult). 
o If new framework deviates significantly from current HIPAA rules, there will be costs and 
disruptions in information flows due to covered entities and their business associates having 
to adjust to new or even dual standards.  Further, the resources already spent coming into 
compliance with HIPAA will be wasted. (Note that these concerns could be ameliorated by 
building on the current HIPAA rules, or by applying new standards only to entities not 
currently covered by HIPAA).   
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9 Keep the law in its current state and encourage the adoption of good privacy practices through 
voluntary business agreements and/or certification. 
 
Arguments For 
o Requires no further action from Congress or the Administration. 
o Less stringent approach arguably allows for more innovative responses to addressing 
privacy and security issues. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Compliance through voluntary business agreements or certification (or other voluntary 
business commitments) will not achieve a uniform baseline of protections.  Consumers do 
not always have the option to choose providers, plans or other health services based on 
privacy and security practices when care is needed and resources are scarce. 
o Will be perceived by some stakeholders as a lack of response to the privacy and security 
concerns raised by e-health; thus, may not accomplish much with respect to building trust 
in e-health systems. 
o Requires covered entities to continue the expense and administrative efforts to comply with 
the HIPAA privacy requirements and allows other entities working in the same space to be 
relieved of these corresponding responsibilities and expenses.  
B. What Is Covered 
 
Electronic health information exchanges and the rise of consumer-focused health management tools 
hold great potential for improving the flow of information necessary for good health care and helping 
individuals take a greater role in improving their own health.  But to realize this potential, consumers 
need to trust that their personal health information will be kept private, confidential, and secure.  As 
information becomes more accessible and moves more freely in an electronic exchange environment, 
current policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of, health information may be inadequate 
and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT.   
 
A number of the issues discussed below relate to perceived deficiencies in the HIPAA Privacy Rule.   
Some argue that it makes little sense to try to re-open the compromises that were reached in the current 
Privacy Rule and instead urge policymakers to focus on how best to address the new challenges raised 
by the emerging e-health environment.  Others argue that perceived deficiencies in the Rule will need 
to be addressed in order to build trust in e-health, regardless of the source of the problem. The 
following have been raised as issues that may need to be addressed in order to remove distrust as an 
obstacle to the widespread adoption of health IT and health information exchange. 
 
1. Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws 
 
Some have suggested dealing with privacy concerns by prohibiting the use of personal health 
information to discriminate against individuals with respect to health insurance and employment - two 
of the key privacy concerns raised by consumers.  This is the approach taken in the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which prohibits the use of genetic information to 
make health insurance coverage determinations and in employment-related decisions.  Some believe 
that passing anti-discrimination legislation based on health information or health status32 would 
address the most critical privacy concerns and relieve the pressure to enact standards that 
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“micromanage” an entity’s use of health information, which could create obstacles to the information 
sharing that can improve individual health and the U.S. healthcare system. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining the 
terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage. 
 
Arguments For 
o As noted above, addresses the most critical consumer fears about use of their health 
information; could obviate need for specific, detailed provisions on information uses for 
other purposes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Raises larger public policy issues that in the past have been difficult to resolve and that 
should be discussed in the broader context of health reform (e.g., to what extent employers 
can use health status in making employment decisions, particularly where fitness for duty is 
a work issue; and to what extent should government (particularly the federal government) 
regulate the business of insurance, which is dependent on the ability to assess and manage 
health claims risk).   
o May be more difficult than enacting specific standards governing use of information in a 
range of other contexts; even if anti-discrimination legislation could be enacted, it wouldn’t 
necessarily resolve all privacy concerns. 
 
2. Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard 
 
There is no federal law requiring that individuals be notified if their personal health information is 
breached – i.e., inadvertently disclosed to or accessed by the public or persons or entities not 
authorized to see it.   A number of states have enacted laws requiring persons to be notified if their 
personal data is breached.  Only three of these laws explicitly apply to identifiable health 
information,33 but some general state breach notification laws may be interpreted to apply to health 
information.34   As a result, individuals only have a right to be notified if their personal health 
information is inappropriately accessed or disclosed if they happen to live in a state with an applicable 
law, or if their information was breached by an organization that voluntarily provides breach 
notification as part of its risk mitigation practices.  Receiving notice of health data breaches gives 
individuals an opportunity to prepare or to try to minimize any potential damage (if possible).  A 
breach notification requirement also arguably provides incentives for holders of health data to take the 
strongest measures possible to protect against breach. The House bills each included similar breach 
notification provisions, and the amendment to the Senate “Wired for Healthcare Quality Act of 2008” 
(S.1693) circulated by Senator Patrick Leahy (referred to in this paper as the “Leahy amendment”) 
would have tasked the Secretary of HHS to establish a breach notification standard. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.   
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Arguments For 
o Establishes a national right of individuals to be notified if health information is breached 
and establishes national consensus on what constitutes a breach. 
o Enactment of a strong federal standard could help facilitate stakeholder agreement for 
preemption of state health information breach notification laws, which would provide a 
more consistent policy environment for organizations that operate nationwide. 
o Could be done by regulation (modification to the Privacy Rule) with respect to covered 
entities.  
 
Arguments Against 
o Could be difficult to come to consensus on the trigger for breach notification.  However, 
without such a standard, consumers could be inundated with alerts about data breaches that 
do not involve their information, where there is little chance data recipients could access 
their personal information, or that the breach would be used to harm them.  California, for 
example, imposes a strict liability standard – requiring notification except in cases where 
the data is encrypted.  Other states follow a harm-based standard – requiring notification 
only if the individual suffers some type of harm.   Consumer advocates argue that defining 
“harm” with respect to breaches of personal health information requires a standard beyond 
financial harm, such as discrimination, stigma, or embarrassment.  Data holders may find it 
difficult to determine whether or not a particular breach rises to this standard; consumers 
may not trust data holders to appropriately make this determination on their behalf.   
o If requirement applies only to covered entities, it leaves out many organizations and 
institutions that hold or manage personal health information, including: HIPAA business 
associates (who could be required in regulation to notify the covered entity of any breach); 
PHRs offered by non-HIPAA covered entities; and Internet health sites that collect personal 
health information.  Imposing a requirement to notify individuals of breaches on these 
entities would require a law of broader application, which may be more difficult to enact. 
 
9 Status quo (i.e., leave for states to address or to market forces).  
 
Arguments For 
o Companies will develop more innovative technologies for protecting information if they 
compete based on their privacy and security policies and practices, including those dealing 
with breach notification. 
o It is not clear that that this is a new issue raised by the movement to electronic records, 
which suggests it is not something that needs to be addressed at this time. 
 
Arguments Against 
o It is unclear that this is something the market alone will fix.  Entities holding health 
information would likely come to different conclusions as to whether or not it is necessary 
to notify in the event of a breach.    
o Breaches of greater volumes of records are more likely to occur as we store and move 
information electronically.  Failure to address this issue creates an obstacle to building trust 
in e-health systems.  
o Relying on states is unlikely to achieve protection for all patients. 
o Continuing to leave this to state law exacerbates the inconsistent policy environment for 
health care entities that operate nationally or across state lines. 
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3.  Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes  
 
The major health reform proposals all require the robust collection of health data for a number of 
purposes, including:  measuring provider performance; determining whether particular treatments are 
effective; monitoring health data for safety signals with respect to new drugs and devices; health 
research; public health surveillance and bioterrorism; and for commercial purposes (for example, 
determining how often providers are prescribing a particular drug product).  The Privacy Rule permits 
the use or disclosure of identifiable information for some of these purposes, including:  quality 
assessment and improvement activities; public health reporting; and for health care operations such as 
the credentialing and licensing of health care professionals.  However, some of these activities occur 
now with the use of information stripped of patient identifiers, and some privacy advocates have begun 
calling for increased use of data stripped of patient identifiers in lieu of using fully identifiable 
information where it is possible to do so and still accomplish the purpose for which the data was 
legitimately accessed. 
 
The Privacy Rule includes two ways that covered entities may use or disclose data stripped of patient 
identifiers:  de-identification and the limited data set.  Data that qualifies as “de-identified” is not 
protected by the provisions of the Rule, and therefore there are no limits on how such data can be used 
and to whom it can be disclosed.   
 
Data can qualify as “de-identified” in one of two ways.  Under what is known as the statistical method, 
an expert must determine that the “risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in 
combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify an 
individual who is a subject of the information.”35  The alternative method (often referred to as the “safe 
harbor”) requires that the covered entity strip out a number of specific data points, including name, 
address, identifying numbers, and biometric data.36  In addition, the covered entity releasing the data 
must have no actual knowledge, or reasonable basis to believe, that the information can be easily re-
identified.37   
 
A limited data set is information stripped of a number of the same specific data points as required for 
the de-identification safe harbor.38  Covered entities may release a limited data set only for purposes of 
research, public health, and health care operations, and must execute a data use agreement with the 
entity receiving the data set that sets forth the permitted uses and disclosures of the data and that does 
not authorize use or disclosure in contravention of the provisions of the Privacy Rule.39   
 
Some believe the current de-identification and limited data set provisions raise a number of concerns: 
 
• The de-identification safe harbor standard is now more than five years old, and today there is 
much greater access to information via public databases (a development that will only increase 
in the future).  It may now be easier to re-identify data,40 and some have called for an update to 
the standard, or at least an examination of whether it is as effective as it was when first enacted.  
Others have questioned whether it remains good public policy to allow data that fits the de-
identification standard to remain uncovered by the Privacy Rule.   
 
• Limited data set users must commit to not re-identifying the data, and covered entities may 
only release de-identified data if it meets the standard, which is supposed to ensure a very low 
risk of re-identification.  But if data is re-identified, either by limited data set recipients or by 
holders of de-identified data, the ability to hold those persons or entities accountable is very 
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limited.  In the case of a limited data set, the data holder is only contractually obligated to the 
covered entity not to re-identify; a covered entity can be held responsible for the actions of the 
data set recipient if 1) the entity knew of a “pattern or practice” that constituted a material 
breach or a violation of the data use agreement and 2) the covered entity took no action.41  With 
fully de-identified data, the information can be shared with non-covered entities and does not 
require the execution of a contract – thus there are no applicable legal prohibitions against, or 
penalties for, re-identification, and such prohibitions are not required to be imposed on the data 
recipient via contract (although nothing in the law prevents data holders from voluntarily 
imposing such a condition). 
 
• Researchers and others, including people with rare or chronic illnesses, are concerned that the 
limited data set and de-identification standards – in particular, the provisions that require the 
elimination of specific data points – make the data unusable for many research and public 
health purposes.  They would prefer some middle ground, where the data is stripped of those 
identifiers that can be easily used to re-identify (such as name, full address, and identifying 
numbers) but a sufficient amount of data is retained to accomplish the purposes for which the 
data is sought.   
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 HHS should seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification safe 
harbor to determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of re-identification, 
and make any appropriate revisions to the Rule.  
 
Arguments For 
o Allows for a public process for re-examining the standard and helps ensure that any 
changes to the standard are based on the latest science. 
o The House bills each had provisions tasking HHS to examine the de-identification standard, 
indicating some support for such an initiative.   
 
Arguments Against 
o Because the current standard requires data holders to have no “reasonable basis” for 
believing the de-identified data could be used to identify an individual (and no actual 
knowledge that the information could be re-identified), the standard is already flexible and 
robust enough. 
 
9 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and require 
data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the threshold of full 
de-identification). 
 
Arguments For 
o Could address concerns raised by some that the current options do not serve many 
legitimate needs for data stripped of some patient identifiers. 
o Could help entities use such “lesser identified” data for activities that today use fully 
identifiable data (for example, many of the activities covered by health care operations and 
some research). 
o Helps ensure that all data recipients are held accountable. 
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Arguments Against 
o Policymakers will face a difficult task in determining the permitted uses of various new 
data set options.  Could result in an environment that is either less protective or overly 
stringent compared to the one that exists today.  
o Requiring data use agreements for all disclosures can be a cumbersome process with little 
relation to privacy protections. 
o Requiring such agreements could obstruct the flow of information for public health 
reporting, syndromic surveillance, bioterrorism detection, and other important public 
purposes.  
o Data recipients are only held accountable by the terms of their contracts.   
 
9 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to not re-
identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, notifications about a serious 
public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications). 
 
Arguments For 
o Attacks the key concern with respect to the use of data stripped of patient identifiers 
without the perceived risks associated with a more comprehensive re-opening of the Rule or 
the de-identification standard. 
 
Arguments Against 
o The arguments above apply here.  Most likely, this is possible only through a data use 
agreement, and currently such agreements are not required when information is de-
identified.  
 
4.  Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes 
 
Among consumer views on health information privacy, use of their personal information for marketing 
purposes ranks among the top concerns.  For example, in a 2006 survey asking Americans about the 
benefits of and concerns about online health information, 77% reported being “very concerned” about 
their information being used for marketing purposes.42   The HIPAA Privacy Rule governs a covered 
entity’s use of an individual’s health information for marketing purposes, but there are no rules 
regarding use of health information for marketing purposes by entities not covered by the Rule.  With 
respect to information in personal health records, or voluntarily shared on Internet health sites, use for 
marketing purposes will be governed by whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements apply, the 
vendor’s or site’s terms of use or privacy policy, or what individuals may knowingly or inadvertently 
authorize. 
 
The Privacy Rule prohibits covered entities from using a person’s identifiable information for 
marketing purposes without his or her prior authorization.  The definition of what constitutes 
“marketing” is a communication about a product or service that encourages the recipient to purchase or 
use that product or service.43   The definition includes a number of exceptions that were crafted to 
allow covered entities to send important health-related communications to their patients and enrollees 
without having to first obtain individual authorization.  For example, covered entities may use personal 
information to communicate with an individual about his or her treatment; for case management or 
care coordination, or to recommend alternative therapies, providers, or settings of care; or to describe 
products or services in a benefits plan or value-added services available only to plan enrollees.44 
Individuals whose personal information is used to make a communication exempt from the marketing 
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rule also do not have the right to object to (or opt out of) their personal information being used for 
these purposes.45 
 
The Privacy Rule prohibits a covered entity from selling (without authorization) protected health 
information about its patients or enrollees to outside entities so that those entities can directly market 
their products and services. However, such outside entities could pay the covered entity to use 
protected health information to make those communications – and as long as those communications 
fell under one of the exceptions to the marketing definition, authorization would not be required.  
Some see this as a loophole, enabling outside entities to pay covered entities to send targeted 
marketing communications that the entities could not send themselves without express individual 
authorization.  Others believe the rule strikes the right balance – ensuring that protected health 
information remains with the covered entity (or its business associate), and allowing beneficial 
communications to be sent to patients and enrollees without having to ask first for patient authorization 
(which under the Privacy Rule must be fairly detailed).  
 
The polling data is clear that individuals feel strongly about the use of their information without their 
consent for marketing purposes.  There does not appear to be consensus, however, on whether the 
marketing provisions in the Privacy Rule need to be revised in order to build trust in e-health systems.   
Some claim that direct marketing to individuals helps drive up the cost of care; others point to 
communications that can help lower costs and ensure individuals get appropriate care (such as 
communications to facilitate medication adherence, or about lower-cost therapeutic alternatives or free 
or low-cost prevention services).  The House bills would have clarified the marketing definition in the 
Privacy Rule to make it clear that communications sent by covered entities and paid for by outside 
interests constitute marketing and therefore require prior authorization.46  But some stakeholders 
expressed concern that this would have made it more difficult for covered entities to send beneficial 
communications to their patients and enrollees because outside entities often provide the resources 
necessary to fund these communications.   
 
Policymakers have not yet begun to address concerns about the use of personal health information in 
PHRs and on Internet sites for marketing purposes.  
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 Strengthen HIPAA rules requiring prior authorization for use of personal information for 
marketing by covered entities and establish rules for use of information for marketing purposes 
by non-covered entities.  
 
Arguments For 
o Attacks a key concern of the public with respect to uses of their health information.  Could 
be structured in a way that permits some targeted communication with patients for 
legitimate health purposes but without creating loopholes that end up permitting the use of 
personal information for the purpose of marketing a broad range of health-related products 
and services.   
o Could be accomplished by regulatory change with respect to marketing by covered entities 
and their business associates. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Would require legislation for non-covered entities. 
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o Drawing the line between “good marketing” – using individuals’ information to send 
communications that clearly advance their health or health care – and “commercial 
marketing” – where the communication is arguably related to health but where the benefit 
to the individual is less clear or is secondary to the commercial interests of the entity 
sponsoring the communication – can be difficult.  There also are stakeholders either firmly 
committed to preserving the status quo or concerned that any changes could have 
unintended consequences for patient health or health care business operations. 
o There could be negative health consequences for individuals (e.g., no or less information 
about available benefits, treatment alternatives, etc.). 
 
9 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions by issuing additional guidance 
about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.” 
 
Arguments For 
o Does not require amendment to the Rule (although could be done in conjunction with 
amending the Rule to enhance understanding of the Rule’s provisions and improve 
compliance). 
o Could result in more communications, which today are allowable under different 
interpretations of the marketing exemptions, being deemed to be “marketing” and therefore 
requiring prior authorization.   
o Would continue to allow essential communications to individuals that directly impact their 
health, care, and outcomes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Depending on the content of the guidance, could inadvertently bless more marketing uses 
without patient authorization than occur today. 
o Because it preserves the perceived inadequacies in the current Rule, unclear how well such 
an initiative would build consumer trust. 
 
9 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of information 
for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules governing marketing 
uses by PHRs and Internet health sites. 
 
Arguments For 
o Avoids more difficult re-negotiation of the Rule for current actors and instead targets new 
challenges raised by e-health. 
o Challenge of finding a viable business model for electronic exchange networks – and 
potentially PHRs – makes the information held in or exchanged through these vehicles a 
potentially attractive target for marketers, strengthening the case for targeting this area for 
strong regulation. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Does not address what some perceive to be deficiencies in the Rule today (for example, the 
use of protected health information without prior patient authorization by covered entities to 
send communications that are paid for by an outside company and that encourage the 
patient to use that company’s goods and services). 
o Depending on the terms of the specific rule, could potentially cut off a source of operating 
revenue for these exchanges. 
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9 Change Rule from the current “opt-in (but with exceptions)” approach to instead allow 
individuals to opt-out of receiving all marketing communications, including those that today 
are exempt from the definition of marketing. 
 
Arguments For 
o Could be easier to implement without the need to determine which communications are 
“good” (and thus should be permitted without authorization) and which should first require 
explicit patient permission. 
o Assumes patients want to receive these communications but empowers patients to stop 
them if they object. 
o In a variation, could also retain the authorization requirement for communications that 
qualify under the current marketing definition (thus, permitting opt-out for those 
communications that are currently exempt from the definition but that consumers could still 
view as marketing).   
 
Arguments Against 
o Places burden on individual to police how their information is and isn’t used – clear 
boundaries on use of information provide more reliable protections for privacy. 
o Arguably less protective than current rule, which requires authorization to use information 
for marketing with some exceptions (unless authorization requirement is retained for those 
uses that currently qualify as marketing). 
o Stifles needed information for individuals and could result in negative health outcomes. 
 
9 Leave current Rule as is; allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis of their 
policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAA-covered entities 
could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of information for marketing 
purposes, and compete on that basis). 
 
Arguments For 
o Does not require changes to current law. 
o Could lead to more privacy-protective environment if robust “privacy competition” 
emerges. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Few individuals know the extent to which their information is used to market or make 
health-related communications to them. Thus, they may be unlikely to inquire or make 
decisions based on use of their information for these purposes.  This may be particularly 
true in a health care context, where choice of care provider involves a myriad of important 
variables – and where many individuals do not have choices (or a wide range of choices) 
with respect to their sources of care.   
o Unless the policy is clearly articulated, explanations of uses of information in a privacy 
policy may not be clear.  A clear policy could explicitly state, in part: “we do not use your 
information to recommend products or services to you under any circumstances”.  
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5.  Other Areas where HIPAA Could be Strengthened 
 
As personal health information is accessed and exchanged more easily in the new electronic 
environment, HIPAA policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of, health information may 
be inadequate and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT and health information exchange.  
Some of these issues are new ones raised by the new e-health environment, while others were initially 
raised during the HIPAA regulatory debates and may or may not be exacerbated by the new 
information sharing models.  In the past year policymakers have considered addressing the following: 
 
• Uncertainty regarding how to apply the “minimum necessary” standard.  Under the Privacy 
Rule, access to, and uses and disclosures of, personal health information must be limited to the 
minimum necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose for accessing the information, except 
with respect to treatment.47  This standard was intended to be flexible in order to accommodate 
a broad range of circumstances, but the lack of clear boundaries has resulted in a great deal of 
confusion about how to comply.48  Some believe further guidance on the minimum necessary 
standard could help resolve this uncertainty.   The House bills included provisions that would 
deem covered entities to be in compliance with the minimum necessary standard if they used 
the limited data set.  This arguably encourages entities to use data stripped of a number of 
patient identifiers unless identifiable information is needed.  However, some stakeholders have 
expressed concern that the limited data set would have little utility for most payment and health 
care operations uses due to the number of data points that need to be stripped out in order for it 
to qualify. 
• Perception among some privacy and patient advocates that “health care operations” permits too 
much sharing of personal health information.  Under the Privacy Rule, “health care operations” 
is specifically defined.  However, a number of the descriptions are very broad and permit use 
and disclosure of personal health information for functions that could be achieved without 
patient identifiers or could be done only with the consent or authorization of the patient.  For 
example, health care operations include activities such as: conducting quality assessment and 
improvement activities; reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care 
professionals; underwriting and premium rating; auditing; and business management and 
general administrative activities - such as due diligence related to a merger, customer service 
functions, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity (see Appendix B for a complete 
list).  The Privacy Rule also permits covered entities to share health information with another 
covered entity for the purpose of the recipient entities’ health care operations, as long as both 
entities have a relationship with the patient.49  
The PRO(TECH)T Act of 2008 would have required patient consent (not authorization) for 
health care operations uses.  A number of stakeholders expressed concern that this provision 
would significantly stifle uses of health care information for important purposes like public 
health and quality measurement; others noted that because treatment and coverage could be 
conditioned on patients giving their consent to health care operations uses, it would provide 
little meaningful privacy protection.  The Health-e Technology Act of 2008 took a different 
approach, tasking HHS to examine the definition of health care operations and determine which 
functions could be performed with de-identified data and which should require prior 
authorization.  It is unclear whether the 111th Congress will pursue some version of either 
approach.  
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• Uncertainty regarding which Privacy Rule provisions should apply to health information 
exchanges.   As noted above, the Privacy Rule currently does not apply to health information 
exchanges (for example, RHIOs, HIEs, and ePrescribing Gateways), except those that may 
qualify as healthcare clearinghouses.   Many of these entities have executed business associate 
agreements with the covered entities that participate in the exchange.  However, it is not clear 
that all have done so, which has prompted some to call for a requirement that these exchanges 
either be covered entities or enter into business associate agreements (depending on their 
structure and function).  
But securing coverage under HIPAA, either directly or as a business associate, only addresses 
part of the question.  Once covered, policymakers need to determine the data access, use, and 
disclosure rules that will apply to these new entities.  For example, should a person’s 
identifiable health information be used in these exchanges only for treatment of the individual, 
or can it be accessed to treat another individual?  Under the Privacy Rule today, covered 
entities can use one patient’s identifiable information for treating another patient.50 This 
permissive use raises privacy concerns, particularly when data on any patient can be accessed 
across multiple institutions and providers participating in a network.  Should exchanges be 
accessible for payment purposes, or to accomplish health care operations?  Should exchanges 
exist only to facilitate the health care activities of the covered entities participating in the 
exchange, or should the exchange itself be permitted to use data for its own purposes?  What if 
some of the entities providing support for and participating in the exchange are not themselves 
covered by HIPAA?  In the absence of clear rules, health exchanges are working out the rules 
of the road on their own, often with multi-stakeholder involvement.  There has been no 
objective study of the results to date. 
• Confusion regarding whether quality improvement uses of identifiable health information is a 
health care operation (not requiring patient consent) or research, which requires authorization 
except in certain circumstances.  As noted multiple times throughout this paper, health reform 
proposals are looking to health IT as the linchpin for providing the data that will help improve 
quality of care.  The Privacy Rule permits the use of identifiable health information without 
patient consent for “quality assessment and improvement activities, including outcomes 
evaluation and development of clinical guidelines” – as long as “obtaining generalizable 
knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from those activities.”51 The 
Privacy Rule also permits the use of identifiable information without patient consent for 
population-based activities relating to improving health or reducing health care costs, and 
protocol development.52  Separate provisions of the Privacy Rule permit covered entities to use 
and disclose identifiable information for research purposes; such research requires specific 
authorization from the patient unless an IRB or Privacy Board waives the requirement based on 
the low risk to patient privacy.53 (As noted above, use of de-identified data or a limited data set 
for research purposes is also permitted and in most cases will not require prior patient 
authorization.)  Confusion about which provision applies to what types of quality improvement 
activities could hinder efforts to implement more robust measurement and other quality 
improvement efforts. 
• Inability to meaningfully restrict access to and disclosure of health information.  Under the 
Privacy Rule, individuals have a right to request a restriction on the use and disclosure of their 
health information – but covered entities are neither required to comply with the request, nor 
provide a reason for noncompliance.54  If a covered entity grants the request, however, it must 
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comply.  Some have advocated for granting a stronger right to restrict access to information, 
particularly with respect to information that is exchanged electronically through the “National 
Health Information Network” (NHIN).  For example, NCVHS has recommended allowing 
people to choose whether or not their information is included in the NHIN, and to be able to 
restrict network access to data in certain sensitive categories.55  In its recommendation 
regarding the right to restrict access to sensitive information, NCVHS acknowledged that few 
individuals would likely make such a request; but noted that individuals would strongly value 
the right and ability to do so.56  The House bills included provisions that would have required 
covered entities, upon patient request, to restrict access to data for payment and health care 
operations, as long as the patient paid in full for the care.   
Technology may improve the ability for health data holders to segregate sensitive data and 
comply with a patient request to restrict data access.  However, if compliance with such a 
restriction is mandatory, providers, plans and other health data holders will likely seek to be 
held harmless for inadvertent access and disclosure of information in contravention of a 
patient’s requested restriction, as long as the holders used reasonable efforts to comply.  
NCVHS also recognized that providers should be notified if a patient has decided to sequester 
or restrict access to information in a sensitive category, but they left for further discussion how 
this notification would take place.57  Further, a requirement that applies only to those with 
electronic records risks creating disincentives for providers and others to move from paper to 
electronic systems.   
• Uncertainty over patients’ rights to access their records electronically, or receive an electronic 
copy.  The effort to engage more individuals in their health care through the use of consumer-
facing electronic tools such as PHRs will not be successful if individuals cannot easily and 
promptly obtain electronic access to, or electronic copies of, their health records.   Under the 
Privacy Rule, patients have the right to access, and obtain a copy of, their health information in 
the form or format requested, “if it is readily producible in that form or format.”58  Some 
believe that this language already obligates providers and plans with electronic health records 
to provide an electronic copy of the record.  Anecdotal reports, however, suggest that providers 
are not clear on their obligations and that patients have had difficulty obtaining copies of their 
health records in electronic format, in part because not all electronic health record applications 
facilitate the easy production of electronic copies.  In general, difficulty in obtaining a copy of 
one’s record, even in paper format, is the one of the top five HIPAA complaints investigated by 
OCR.59  Also, some believe that the timeframe for responding to a records request – which is at 
least 30 days under the current Rule60 – should be shortened when those records are kept 
electronically, and that the cost to consumers of obtaining an electronic copy should be free or 
set at a level more commensurate with the costs of making electronic an electronic copy 
available.  Under the current Rule, such costs are required to be “reasonable” and “cost-
based”;61 however, most states set limits on copying charges for medical records, which range 
from free (Kentucky) to $37.00 for up to the first 10 pages of a hospital record (Texas).62  
• Controversy over the appropriate role for patient consent or authorization.  The Privacy Rule 
permits the gathering and sharing of information for a range of purposes without the need to 
first obtain the patient’s consent.  For uses and disclosures not specifically permitted under the 
Privacy Rule, a patient’s specific written authorization is required.  An earlier version of the 
Rule would have required patient consent for treatment, payment, and health care operations; 
but providers and plans could have conditioned treatment or coverage on obtaining patient 
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consent for these routine uses of their information.63 However, this version was harshly 
criticized by the health care industry, who argued that the requirements would hinder the 
delivery of treatment, the processing of payments, and other routine activities by requiring 
consent to be obtained over and over again.64   In response, HHS amended this version in 2002 
before it went into effect and replaced it with the structure that is in place today:  permissive 
use of information for certain routine health purposes: authorization required for uses and 
disclosures not specifically enumerated in the Rule; and plans and providers may not condition 
providing coverage or treatment on the patient’s execution of such an authorization.65 A 
number of privacy advocates harshly criticized the amendment, and some continue to call for 
restoration of the earlier version requiring consent for nearly all uses and disclosures of health 
information.66 Others note that such consent could not possibly be voluntary, and that 
overreliance on consent unfairly shifts the burden for protecting privacy to individuals and not 
to the organizations holding the data.67  Some entities would not likely support such a proposal, 
as requiring individual consent for routine health care functions could stifle necessary payment 
and other important processes.   
 
Also relevant is whether there should be an enhanced role for patient choice with respect to 
whether or not health information is included in an electronic exchange network.  Exchange 
networks across the country are considering, and some have begun to implement, consent 
policies that require people to opt-in to, or allow them to opt-out of, sharing their health 
information through an exchange network either in whole or in part (such as by provider or by 
type of information).68   In general, those networks must balance the extent to which providing 
consumers with meaningful choice about having their personal information exchanged in a 
local, state, or national network increases patient trust and values individual autonomy against 
the consequences both for individuals and for the system of having potentially incomplete data 
available for treatment decisions and public health.  As noted above, NCVHS has 
recommended that individuals at least have the right to opt-out of information sharing through 
the NHIN.69 Additionally, the Markle Foundation’s Common Framework released in 2006 - 
Resources for Implementing Private and Secure Health Information Exchanges, recommends 
giving patients control by allowing them to create a second or third identity for records they 
want to keep out of networked electronic records exchanges.70 Although a number of sources 
have begun informally tracking the policies of various exchanges throughout the country, there 
has been no systematic study of the impact of the various policy models being adopted. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule. 
 
Arguments For 
o A common sense and prompt way to address a number of the above issues, including:  
confusion regarding the minimum necessary rule; which quality measurement/improvement 
activities are permitted without consent as health care operations and which constitute 
research and require authorization absent a waiver; and the obligation of covered entities to 
provide individuals with electronic copies of their health records.   
o Could be combined with a new system whereby stakeholders, without penalty, can ask the 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to publicly opine on whether certain proposed health 
information uses or disclosures are in compliance with the Rule. 
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Arguments Against 
o OCR is already under-resourced, and without a resource increase may not be able to issue 
guidance promptly and on as broad a range of topics as desirable.  Also probably not 
possible without more resources to institute any new program to publicly issue specific 
responses to stakeholder questions.  
o Guidance alone may not be sufficient to address all of the concerns raised above. 
 
9 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that limit 
the use of identifiable data without consent.  The regulations could require more of the current 
health care operations to be done with data stripped of some patient identifiers, or could 
potentially require authorization for some uses that today are permitted without consent. 
Another possible option is for HHS to issue guidance on the “minimum necessary” standard 
that encompasses both the extent of data accessed, as well as the extent of “identifiability” of 
the data, for health care operations purposes. 
 
Arguments For 
o Addresses directly one of the biggest concerns that privacy advocates have with the Privacy 
Rule. 
o Outcome could enhance privacy while still allowing the use of data for a range of 
operational purposes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Health care industry has five years of experience working with HIPAA and will be 
concerned about not being permitted to use identifiable data for the same broad range of 
purposes as is permitted today.  A possible compromise could be to allow use of 
identifiable data only for an entity’s own health care operations, whether performed by the 
entity itself or a business associate on its behalf.  However, this compromise may not be 
feasible in a more interconnected health system. 
o Because of the significant interests involved, could be difficult to achieve, even in a 
regulatory context. 
o Requiring the use of data stripped of patient identifiers for routine operations could increase 
health care costs.  Additionally, as many health care operations are closely linked to 
treatment and payment functions, delays may result in information sharing for these 
purposes as well as for health care operations that help facilitate quality improvement 
efforts.   
o Could result in broad requirements that negatively impact essential health care operations 
such as quality improvement programs. 
 
9 HHS could issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information 
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice. 
 
Arguments For 
o For states currently establishing exchanges, a clear set of baseline rules could clarify the 
difficulty of trying to achieve a mutual agreement among stakeholders. 
o Public trust will be enhanced if these entities are subject to enforceable rules about how 
they can and cannot use health information. 
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Arguments Against 
o It is too early to establish rules to govern the behavior of these exchanges.  Premature 
regulation may stifle local variation and innovation.  (Note that, in the alternative, 
exchanges could at least be required to adopt policies that are consistent with a health fair 
information practices models such as the Markle Common Framework). 
o Viable business models for long-term operation of these exchanges have yet to be 
established and regulating too stringently or early in this space could jeopardize their 
implementation. 
 
9 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA floor 
could occur through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification. 
 
Arguments For 
o Such an approach is consistent with the HIPAA model, which provides a baseline floor of 
standards and allows for states to adopt more stringent laws and for the private sector to 
voluntarily promote and adopt more stringent privacy protections. 
o Likely easier to accomplish than regulatory or legislative change.   
o May be more cost-effective than imposing through a top-down regulatory approach. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Patients care about their health information privacy, but often don’t make health care 
decisions based on an institution’s privacy policies, as noted above.  There will be few (if 
any) market incentives for enhancing privacy, thus there is a strong role for public policy to 
play. 
o Voluntary adoption of best practices and certification is less likely to achieve broad-based 
adoption of stronger privacy protection.  
o Certification, which typically occurs only in time intervals, may be inappropriate for 
ensuring adequate protections for privacy.  For example, a health IT product may be 
certified to include certain functionalities that are privacy-enhancing, such as role-based 
access and audit trails.  But if these functions are not being consistently used, or if the entity 
is not monitoring compliance (or being actively monitored for compliance), certification 
does little to enhance privacy protection. 
 
C. State Law Variation   
As noted above, because HIPAA was structured to provide a floor of protections, state laws providing 
more stringent protections for health information are expressly preserved.  Movement towards an 
interconnected national health information network raises concerns that the multiplicity of state 
privacy laws will create an obstacle to the nationwide electronic exchange of health information or the 
exchange of information regionally across state lines.  Others have noted the difficulty in determining a 
particular state’s health privacy laws, as they are often a combination of statute, regulation and 
guidance, customary practice, and common law. 
Possible Solutions 
9 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws. A possible 
alternative is to set a single federal standard that preempts existing state law (i.e., “wipes the 
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slate clean”), but allow states to pass new laws establishing stronger privacy provisions 
(perhaps within a certain window of time). 
Arguments For 
o Should eliminate confusion and create a more consistent policy environment for privacy 
and nationwide electronic health information exchange. 
o Makes more sense in a health care arena increasingly dominated by multi-state players. 
o The alternative approach preserves the ability for states to re-enact those privacy provisions 
they deem to be most important while making it easier for cross-state actors to understand 
and comply with relevant laws (because there will likely be fewer of them). 
 
Arguments Against 
o Congress intended the HIPAA Privacy Rule to provide a floor of protections – not a ceiling.  
Thus, if the single national standard is the set of current HIPAA rules, some stakeholders 
will fight any attempts to decrease privacy protections for individuals living in states with 
laws that are currently stronger than HIPAA. 
o The more stringent state laws typically cover more sensitive health information, such as 
mental health, sexually transmitted diseases, or HIV/AIDS.  Efforts to eliminate these 
protections will be opposed by their constituencies and could erode public trust.  
o Another alternative is to create a national standard that is greater than HIPAA (perhaps 
using the states with the most expansive privacy protections as model) – but this may be 
opposed by industry stakeholders, particularly those whose business operations are 
primarily in states with less stringent privacy laws. 
o Many of the state protections for health data were enacted as part of state public health 
reporting statutes – so eliminating the protections could inadvertently jeopardize the 
reporting provisions.  
 
9 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective measures.  
Arguments for and against this option are the reverse of those for the above option. 
 
D. Improving Understanding of and Compliance with HIPAA Protections  
As noted above in the introduction, confusion about the Privacy Rule persists, which often results in 
overly conservative interpretations of the Rule and a failure to share health information even for 
legitimate purposes.   Some attribute this confusion to a lack of education about the substance of the 
Rule; others believe the Rule is too complex to be effective.   In addition, privacy advocates express 
concerns about what they perceive to be a lack of aggressive enforcement of HIPAA.  Others are 
concerned about oversight and enforcement over entities handling personal health information that are 
not covered by HIPAA.  This section of the paper discusses these concerns in more detail. 
1.  Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding  
Possible Solutions  
9 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex.  For example, rely more on broadly worded 
fair information practices and principles and address detailed circumstances through guidance, 
model policies, etc. 
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Arguments For 
o Increases the likelihood that patients and covered entities will understand their rights and 
obligations. 
o Provides more opportunities for innovative approaches to protecting privacy. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Industry has had five years to become accustomed to current law.  Notwithstanding that 
some confusion persists, isn’t it more disruptive to start over? 
o Arguably will not result in a consistent set of baseline rules, and consumers will have to 
read and understand an entity’s policies in order to get a clear picture of how well their 
health information is protected. 
o Alternative is to task HHS with identifying those areas of the Rule that have been the 
largest sources of confusion and target those for simplification.   
 
9 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities covered 
by it. 
Arguments For 
o More guidance and extensive education on the requirements of the Rules could help clear 
up any remaining areas of confusion. 
 
Arguments Against 
o There may not be resources at OCR to support an effective education program.  Is OCR the 
ideal entity to conduct this education, or are there better alternatives (such as an OCR 
partnership with health industry trade associations)?  
o Further, who would set the standards for such programs and is it possible to generate any 
measurable outcomes from them? 
 
9 Improve consumer education on HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a one-page 
summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels.  This could be 
provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could create models. 
 
Arguments For 
o Ensures consumers are provided with a more digestible summary of the most important 
aspects of the Rule. 
o The summary would be provided in addition to the more detailed notice, which would still 
be provided for patients who want to read more details.   
o Is consistent with the “layered notice” approach recommended by privacy advocates. 
o If models are developed and disseminated by HHS, notices will be more consistent. This 
also helps promote greater understanding of the law. 
 
Arguments Against 
o HHS has insufficient resources to accomplish this. 
o It is already burdensome for covered entities to provide, and for patients to read, the 
extensive HIPAA privacy notice that is already required under the law – why should the 
response be to provide consumers with yet another summary of their rights? 
o Consumers may not welcome yet another notice about their privacy rights.  
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2.  Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement 
When Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996, it included civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply 
with the statute, and these penalties applied to the subsequent privacy and security rules implemented 
years later.  But whether the HIPAA rules are being adequately enforced is the subject of some debate 
among policymakers and stakeholders.  
OCR has not levied a single penalty against a HIPAA-covered entity in the nearly five years since the 
rules were implemented, even though that office has found numerous violations of the rules.71. The 
Justice Department has levied some penalties under the criminal provisions of the statute, but a 2005 
opinion from DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressly limits the application of the criminal 
provisions to covered entities and not to individuals working within or on behalf of those covered 
entities (except in cases where an individual’s criminal behavior was actually sanctioned by the 
covered entity). 72   Although DOJ has prosecuted individuals for criminal HIPAA violations in at least 
two instances subsequent to the OLC opinion, some have argued that its release has had a chilling 
effect on HIPAA criminal enforcement.73  
Congress tasked HHS and DOJ with enforcing HIPAA: HHS for civil enforcement and DOJ for 
criminal enforcement.  Within HHS, OCR enforces the Privacy Rule, and CMS enforces the Security 
Rule.  State authorities may be able to enforce HIPAA if their state statutes authorize them to enforce 
federal consumer protection laws.  Otherwise, state authorities can only enforce state health privacy 
laws.  
Some privacy advocates believe that the failure of HHS to aggressively pursue civil monetary penalties 
sends a message to entities that they need not devote significant resources to compliance with the rules.  
They also argue that, without strong enforcement, even the strongest privacy and security protections 
are but an empty promise for patients.  Privacy advocates also are concerned about HIPAA’s failure to 
include a private right of action, which leaves consumers dependent on the federal government and 
without a way to be made whole for any harm due to HIPAA noncompliance.  
 
Covered entities repeatedly express concern about protecting patient privacy and cite the potential 
irreversible damage to their reputations if patients lose confidence in their ability to protect personal 
health information.  The covered entities believe this provides a powerful incentive for them to comply 
with the law.  They argue that strengthening HIPAA’s enforcement provisions would have the 
unintended consequence of stifling appropriate health information sharing, because entities could over 
interpret the Rule in an effort to ensure that they are not using or disclosing information in violation of 
the Rule or in contravention of a patient’s right.  They are worried that providing patients with a 
private right of action would have the same consequence and is more likely to profit attorneys than to 
provide a fair way of promptly compensating patients for any harm that results from failure of a 
covered entity to comply with HIPAA. In addition, some believe that an enforcement approach that 
seeks voluntary compliance from covered entities is a more effective method for actually achieving 
compliance with the requirements. 
 
As discussed above in this paper, privacy advocates are also concerned that the federal government 
currently has no authority to hold business associates accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA.  
Instead, business associates are accountable to the covered entities with which they contract for 
complying with the contract terms and any applicable HIPAA rules.  OCR can only hold covered 
entities responsible for the actions of their business associates if an entity knew of a “pattern of activity 
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or practice of the business associated that constituted a material breach or violation” of its contract and 
the entity did nothing to cure the breach or terminate the contract.74  Of interest, if the covered entity 
decides that terminating the contract is “not feasible,” the entity is required to report the problem to the 
Secretary. 75 However, HIPAA does not give the Secretary any further authority to enforce the statute 
and regulations against the business associate or to hold the covered entity responsible for the 
violation.  Entities serving in the role as business associates argue that contractual liability to the 
covered entity is sufficient to ensure enforcement of applicable HIPAA rules, as the business 
associate’s business and public reputation is at stake if there is a failure to comply.  
 
Some believe the enforcement provisions of the HIPAA statute are poorly worded and partly to blame 
for the current enforcement environment, while others attribute Administration discretion with respect 
to enforcement priorities and a lack of sufficient enforcement resources as more significant factors.  On 
the other hand, some industry stakeholders believe that the enforcement provisions in the statute and 
regulations provide sufficient and clear legal authority for enforcement of the rules, and that the 
combination of the law and non-legal penalties for failure to comply with HIPAA provides sufficient 
protection for consumers.  
 
For entities not covered by HIPAA, enforcement depends on the particular health privacy law that 
applies.  For example, the FTC can use its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority to penalize 
those companies that fail to abide by their privacy policies with respect to the personal health 
information they collect, manage, or store.  Similarly, for those personal health record vendors subject 
to the Electronic Communications Protection Act, the Justice Department can impose criminal fines 
and penalties against entities that release personal health information without the individual record 
holder’s authorization.  Such entities may also be subject to state law claims. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
9 Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA that are 
handling personal health information.   
 
Arguments For 
o Enforcement is a critical part of fair information practices.  Ensuring that non-HIPAA 
entities are subject to enforcement of either currently applicable standards or any new 
standards adopted by Congress and/or the new Administration should be a focus in 2009. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Few will argue that some enforcement structure is needed to build public trust in these new 
health information exchange tools.   It may be harder to agree on the details:  what the 
standards are, who enforces, whether the penalty structure is appropriate, etc.   
 
9  Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement authority.  
The amendments could require the Secretary to formally investigate and impose civil monetary 
penalties in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules.  Or, the provision could clearly state 
that the Secretary can pursue civil actions in cases where a criminal violation may have 
occurred but the Justice Department decides not to pursue the case.  Finally, an amendment 
could correct the Office of Legal Counsel’s interpretation of HIPAA with respect to the ability 
to pursue individuals who violate HIPAA’s criminal provisions.   
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Arguments For 
o Arguably this is just a clarification of current enforcement authority, so it may not be as 
controversial (note that provisions accomplishing the above were part of the Health-e 
Information Technology Act of 2008). 
 
Arguments Against 
o There is already sufficient statutory and regulatory authority to enforce HIPAA. 
o Covered entities may oppose any effort to clarify statutory enforcement authority, viewing 
it as opening the door to more aggressive enforcement.  
 
9 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations 
against business associates. 
 
Arguments For 
o Closes an enforcement loophole and allows the federal government to directly hold 
business associates accountable for complying with HIPAA (provisions to accomplish this 
were in the House bills). 
o Brings federal health privacy law closer to a data stewardship model (i.e., all entities that 
handle personal health information have to comply with baseline standards and can be held 
legally accountable). 
 
Arguments Against 
o Will be vigorously opposed by entities who frequently act as business associates to covered 
entities.  Could cause these entities to be unwilling to contract with health care entities out 
of fear of increased penalties.  If these entities cease providing services, the cost of health 
care products and services could be affected. 
o As an alternative, policymakers could make covered entities responsible for the actions of 
their business associates, which will generate vigorous opposition from covered entities 
who do not want to be legally responsible for behavior not in their control.   
9 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for HIPAA 
violations. 
Arguments For 
o Patients will not have to depend on the government’s taking action when their privacy 
rights have been violated. 
o Provides patients with a way to directly seek redress for privacy violations. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Will generate aggressive opposition, including from those promoting general tort reform.  A 
possible alternative is to re-direct some or all of the civil monetary and criminal penalties 
collected to individuals whose privacy is violated. Provisions to eventually establish a 
method for distributing a percentage of civil monetary penalties to individuals harmed by 
HIPAA violations were included in the Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008.) 
o Not clear that allowing individuals to sue to seek redress for privacy violations is the most 
effective or efficient way to improve enforcement of privacy protections or get individuals 
compensation for harm due to a HIPAA violation.  
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o Individuals are likely to be frustrated with such a cumbersome process.  Litigation is time-
consuming and expensive.  Often, individuals are concerned with exercising their privacy 
rights under HIPAA (e.g., access, amendment) and litigation is neither an efficient nor cost-
effective way to provide immediate results or access.   
o Increased costs from litigation expenses can affect overall health care costs for consumers.  
 
9 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. 
 
Arguments For 
o There is precedent for doing this (see CAN-SPAM, which authorizes state attorneys general 
to enforce federal anti-spam provisions76). 
o Devotes more resources to enforcement without a change to the current provisions. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Requires federal legislation to clearly authorize authorities in all states to enforce HIPAA. 
o Likely controversial, as covered entities may be concerned about overly zealous state 
authorities and the possibility that legitimate data sharing will be thwarted because entities 
will be more cautious.  Provisions were included in the as-introduced version of Health-e 
Information Technology Act of 2008, but attempts to add such a provision to the 
PRO(TECH)T Act were unsuccessful because the provision did not have the support of all 
of the bill’s primary co-sponsors. 
o Potentially opens up the Privacy Rule to 50 different state interpretations. 
o Presents an opportunity for duplicate fines for the same acts/offenses. 
o Unclear whether this would result in better enforcement, as state authorities cannot be 
compelled to enforce federal law.   As a result, only those state authorities with a strong 
desire to enforce HIPAA will likely take advantage of the provision. 
 
9 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.  
 
Arguments For 
o There is no objective evidence that the current enforcement provisions are flawed.  DOJ has 
pursued a handful of criminal violations, notwithstanding the OLC memo.   
o The new Administration should and will set its own enforcement policies with respect to 
criminal and civil HIPAA violations. 
o Covered entities will vigorously enforce the terms of their business associate contracts 
because it is in their best interests to do so, and business associates will use their best efforts 
to comply because it makes good business sense to do so.   
 
Arguments Against 
o Such an approach ignores the flaws in the statute, and the potential that a new 
Administration will have the same perceived difficulty as the current Administration in 
navigating them. 
o Such an approach fails to address the frustration felt by consumers about the perceived lack 
of enforcement of the law. 
o Such an approach leaves business associates with a free pass, creating an unlevel playing 
field. 
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Conclusion 
 
Many believe more efficient sharing of accurate health information is a critical factor in improving 
health care quality for individual patients and for the nation as a whole.  Health information technology 
provides the necessary infrastructure for creating the information-rich health care system we seek – but 
building the infrastructure is not enough.  Consumers, providers, health plans, and other health system 
stakeholders will be reluctant to put information in the system if they don’t trust that it will be 
protected. Privacy and security protections are essential to building this foundation of trust and 
allowing us to reap the benefits that health IT can provide.  
 
For the most part, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of health 
information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and security.  
However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures need to be put in 
place continues to be a challenge.  The 110th Congress adjourned before specific suggested provisions 
could be more fully vetted and advanced further.   
 
The new Administration and new Congress present us with new opportunities to break the privacy 
“gridlock.”  Notwithstanding other critical national issues that need urgent attention, we have never 
had a better opportunity to pursue reform of our health care system, facilitated by interoperable health 
IT with protections for privacy and security. Consistent with the goal of the Legal Solutions in Health 
Reform Project, this paper presents a range of possible solutions to privacy concerns that have been 
raised by some policymakers and stakeholders, along a few of the likely arguments for and against 
each.  Hopefully, it will be a catalyst for making progress on this difficult issue.   
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APPENDIX A – List of Possible Solutions by Issue Category  
 
Who is Covered - Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new legal 
standards for entities not currently covered? 
9 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require OCR to promulgate 
new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these new entities. 
9 Clarify business associate agreements.  Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new regulations or 
strengthen current guidance to ensure that entities receiving protected health information from a 
covered entity – such as exchanges or PHRs that offered by that entity– must enter into a 
business associate agreement or at least be contractually bound to safeguard the information 
and comply with HIPAA. 
9 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies 
consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on to establish 
appropriate policies for handling personal information. 
 
9 Keep the law in its current state but encourage the adoption of good privacy practices through 
voluntary business agreements and/or certification. 
 
What is Covered - What protections need to be in place?  For example, do we rely on current HIPAA 
rules or are modifications needed either to address new challenges or because, in the view of some, the 
rules were insufficient from the start? Are these concerns best addressed through changes in statute or 
regulations, or is it best to police this nascent marketplace through business best practices (or a 
combination of both)? 
Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws 
9 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining the 
terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage. 
 
Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard 
9 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.   
9 Status quo (i.e., leave for states address or to market forces).  
 
Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes  
9 HHS could seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification safe 
harbor.  This could help determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of re-
identification.  If not, HHS could make any appropriate revisions to the Rule.  
9 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and require 
data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the threshold of full 
de-identification). 
9 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to not re-
identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, such as notifications about 
a serious public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications) 
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Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes 
9 Strengthen HIPAA rules for use of personal information for marketing by covered entities by 
requiring prior authorization in more circumstances.  Establish rules for use of information for 
marketing purposes by non-covered entities.  
9 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions rule by issuing additional 
guidance about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.” 
9 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of information 
for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules governing marketing 
uses by PHRs and Internet health sites. 
9 Change Rule to allow individuals to opt-out of receiving any marketing communications, 
including those that today are exempt from the definition of marketing. 
9 Leave current Rule as is and allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis of their 
policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAA-covered entities 
could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of information for marketing 
purposes, and compete on that basis). 
 
Other Areas where HIPAA Could be Strengthened 
9 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule. 
9 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that limit 
the use of identifiable data without consent, which require more of the current health care 
operations to be done with data stripped of some patient identifiers, and to potentially require 
authorization for some uses that today are permitted without consent. HHS could also issue 
guidance on the “minimum necessary” standard that encompasses both the extent of data 
accessed and the extent of “identifiability” of the data, for health care operations purposes. 
9 HHS should issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information 
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice. 
9 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA floor 
through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification. 
 
State Law Variation - Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal standards that 
preempt the field? 
9 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws. 
9 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective measures.  
 
Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections:  How do we ensure 
compliance and appropriate enforcement of privacy protections?  
 
Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding  
9 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex.  For example, the rule could rely on more on 
broadly worded fair information practices and principles and addressing detailed circumstances 
through guidance, model policies, etc.) 
9 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities covered 
by it. 
9 Better educate consumers on their HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a one-page 
summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels.  This could be 
provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could come up with models. 
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 Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement 
9  Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA that are 
handling personal health information.   
9 Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement authority.  
For example, require the Secretary to formally investigate, and impose civil monetary penalties, 
in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules; make it clear that the Secretary can pursue civil 
actions in cases where a criminal violation may have occurred but the Justice Department 
decides not to pursue the case; and correct the Office of Legal Counsel’s interpretation of 
HIPAA with respect to the ability to pursue individuals who violate HIPAA’s criminal 
provisions). 
9 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations 
against business associates. 
9 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for HIPAA 
violations. 
9 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. 
9 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.  
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APPENDIX B – Health Care Operations (defined at 45 CFR 164.501) 
 
Health care operations means any of the following activities of the covered entity to the extent that the 
activities are related to covered functions:  
(1) Conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and 
development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of generalizable knowledge is not 
the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such activities; population-based activities 
relating to improving health or reducing health care costs, protocol development, case management 
and care coordination, contacting of health care providers and patients with information about 
treatment alternatives; and related functions that do not include treatment; 
(2) Reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care professionals, evaluating practitioner 
and provider performance, health plan performance, conducting training programs in which 
students, trainees, or practitioners in areas of health care learn under supervision to practice or 
improve their skills as health care providers, training of non-health care professionals, 
accreditation, certification, licensing, or credentialing activities; 
(3) Underwriting, premium rating, and other activities relating to the creation, renewal or 
replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits, and ceding, securing, or placing a 
contract for reinsurance of risk relating to claims for health care (including stop-loss insurance and 
excess of loss insurance), provided that the requirements of §164.514(g) are met, if applicable;  
(4) Conducting or arranging for medical review, legal services, and auditing functions, including 
fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; 
(5) Business planning and development, such as conducting cost-management and planning-related 
analyses related to managing and operating the entity, including formulary development and 
administration, development or improvement of methods of payment or coverage policies; and  
(6) Business management and general administrative activities of the entity, including, but not 
limited to: 
(i) Management activities relating to implementation of and compliance with the requirements 
of this subchapter;  
(ii) Customer service, including the provision of data analyses for policy holders, plan 
sponsors, or other customers, provided that protected health information is not disclosed to 
such policy holder, plan sponsor, or customer.  
(iii) Resolution of internal grievances;  
(iv) The sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part of the covered entity with another 
covered entity, or an entity that following such activity will become a covered entity and due 
diligence related to such activity; and  
(v) Consistent with the applicable requirements of §164.514, creating de-identified health 
information or a limited data set, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity. 
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